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REVISIONING HEIDEGGER: EXISTENTIELL CRISES AND THE
QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING

Paul Rector
Towson State University
"Before my highest mountain I stand and before my
longest wandering; to that end I must first go down
deeper than ever I descended-deeper into pain than
ever I descended, down into its blackest flood."
-Friedrich Nietzsche, TItUS Spoke Zarathustra
The Heideggerian philosophy of Being and Time,! properly con
ceived, is a pilgrimage. It is an attempt to pave a way into the
uncharted territory of the fundamental ontological question of what
it means to be. The question has thus far remained uncharted not
only because it has been neglected and "covered over" by Western
thought, but also because its pursuit requires confronting the very
reality we spend our lives avoiding: Death. The fundamentalonto
logical question becomes an issue, Heidegger argues, only if we are
responsive to the intimation of nothingness disclosed in angst.
What angst reveals is not some abstract conception of nothing
ness which Dasein may objectively evaluate; rather, it confronts
Dasein with its Sein-zum-tode (Being-towards-death), with its own
liability to nothingness, with its own possibility of the impossibili ty
of its being. Thus, the primary presumption we have about our
selves-that we are-is undermined by an intimation that reveLlls
that we are able not to be. Such intimations are ordinarily not
embraced by Dasein, they are repressed, swallowed by our busy
concern with everyday affairs. But Being and Time is profoundly
under the sway of these intimations and may be read as a beckoning
of the reader to overcome the desire to avoid them. The conversion
Heidegger beckons us to make is one from inauthentic everyday
ness, which is most distinctly characterized by its ontological
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somnambulism, to the authentic, in which we resolutely grasp
ourselves as Being-towards-death. And, as Jerome Miller explains,
"because Being and Time as a whole has principally in view the
undoing of avoidances, it is not just about dying but an exercise in
dying" (Miller, p. 207).
But dying in what sense? What does it mean to die? Can, for
example, the reading of a text be a death? Can the loss of a loved one
or the collapse of a project to which one has devoted one's life be a
death? Can any of these events prompt, as only death can, an
experience of nothingness capable of awakening the fundamental
ontological question in such a radical way that it reaches far beyond
the mere fonning of aninterrogative to the very depths of ourbeing?
William Barrett answers this question negatively when he writes,
"man can surmount all other heartbreaks, even the death's of those
he loves, but his own death puts an end to him" (Barrett, p. 225).2
Sartre, in a different manner than Barrett, argues that such events
cannot be understood as deaths insofar as we never experience
death, but we do experience the various "heartbreaks" described.
Sartre, in direct opposi tion to Heidegger' s assertion that death is our
"owrunost possibility," takes the Epicurean stance that death is
"really nothing, for so long as we are, death has not come, and when
it has come, we are not." Even Heidegger insists that such experi
ences are merely existentiell crises and do not open us to the funda
mental ontological question. 3 To enforce his claim. Heidegger devel
ops a complex nomenclature to distinguish between onticj ontologi
cal experiences and existentiellj existential self-awareness, devotes
section 47 of Being and Time to arguing against the possibility of angst
being spawned by the death of an other, and points out that, for
2 Barrett's statement seems to me to suffer from an inappropriately "literal"
reading of Heidegger. Against stIch a reading, Jerome Miller asserts that: "a literal
reading of Heidegger can mislead one into thinking that an encounter with death
occurs only when one faces one's own physical demise. Being und Time is, among
other things, an argument against just such literality; the encounter with death it
describes occurs whenever one's world is shattered, irrespective of the event which
triggers it" OW, n. 212).
3I've for some time now been grappling with why Heidegger drives such an
uncompromising wedge between ontologically disclosive experiences and ontic/
existentiell experiences. In an obvious way, he is developing rigid distinctions
between the ontic and the ontological because he holds that confusion between the
two was precisely what led Western ontology astray. Further, Heidegger is acu tely
aware of how we often allow the drama of crisis to divert us from the fundamental
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Kierkegaard, the focus on existentiell problems greatly impeded his
understanding of fundamental ontology (BT, p. 494). Heidegger
argues that the loss of loved ones, the reading of "world changing"
texts and the failure of life-long projects, like any other events within
the world, are ontic occurrences-sources of potential existentiell
crises. Rather than advancing the pursuit of fundamental ontology,
they actually hinder progress by drawing us into the world and
diverting us from the "uncanniness" of angst which reveals us as not
at-home within the world.
Thus, the consensus among these thinkers is that existentiell
crises do not and cannot raise the fundamental ontological question
of what it means to be. Instead of being ontologically disclosive, their
powerful impact on our lives evidences how severely we take the
question for granted. But are all existentiell crises fundamentally the
same? Are they all so easily homogenized within the framework of
our everyday existence? Could it be that some of these events disrupt
our lives so radically, shatter us so completely, that no aspect of our
lives remains untouched and that Being itself is revealed as pro
foundly foreign and, for the first time, questionable? In short, is it
reasonable to affirm that while existentiell crises are generally events
that happen within our world, some are so devastating that they can
only be adequat~ly discussed as happening to our world? It is my
claim, and the burden of this essay, that it is not only a reasonable
affirmation, but a necessary one. Those who find this assertion
incompatible with the Heideggerian philosophy of Being and Time, I
will suggest, do not take seriously enough either Heidegger's phe
nomenological analysis of what it means to be-in-the-world, or how
significantly this "basic state of Dasein" grounds our everyday
ontological presuppositions which, in principle, must be shaken if
we are going to ask the fundamental ontological question.
In his discussion of the "worldhood" of the world, Heidegger
illustrates the pre-positional situation of thrown Dasein by underontological question. He would be the first to notice how we talk endlessly about the
horrible things that happen to us. Although ordinarily, the potentially dcvastQting
questions these events raise about the meaning of existence are repressed and
covered over through "idle talk," "curiosity" and "ambiguity," Heidegger's distinc
tion overlooks the possibility that they needn't be. Indeed, these questionsmay be
intelligently addressed and allowed to rupture our deepest ontological assump
tions.
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scoring the prepositional condition of our being-in-the-world-with
others. Countering the modem cOgito, Heidegger argues that we are
not isolated subjects who are aware of our existence through an
awareness of the internal activity of our thinking and who must,
therefore, make a leap (of faith) over an abyss to reach the external
world. Rather, Daseinis "Being-there." We originally find ourselves
amidst the world. Arguing against the Cartesian and Kantian con
ceptions of the world, Heidegger asserts that the "world" is neither
res extensa nor is it merely a collection of objects, that is to say, the sum
of its parts. The "worldhood" of the world, what makes it a world as
such, is that it is more than this sum. The world is an horizon of
meaning in terms of which all objects encountered are interpreted
(BT, pp. 91-148).4 Each given object encountered by Dasein is mean
ingful only in terms of its relation to its place in the totality, and the
totality itself is given coherency by this horizon of meaning. But this
horizon of meaning is neither given nor arbitrary; it blossoms forth
from our involvement in the world. This is no minor distinction. For,
as Dasein, who exists primordially as being-in-the-world-with-oth
ers, and who is "fallen" amidst the world in average everydayness,
we are susceptible to seduction by the "things" we encounter within
the world. In fact, any given object within the world has the potential
to astonish us and pull us under its sway so completely that it comes
to Ittean the world to us. Falling in love, it seems to me, is an extremely
accessible example of this, and its exploration may help draw our
inquiry into phenomenological focus.
Falling in love is truly afallingin that it pulls the ground out from
under us and shatters the compass which governs the direction of
our everyday routines. In a very literal sense, love sends us "head
over heels." Fascinated by the beloved, everything else within the
world seems to fall away as we draw nearer and nearer to her. Duties
once taken so seriously somehow seem far less important; schedules
once adhered to without question are suddenly broken with aban
don; finances once shrewdly dispersed only on essentials are now
spent with spendthrift extravagance on the most impractical of gifts.
4 See 1W, pp. 79-100 for a detailed account of the phenomenological structure
of "Worlds." Also, see Habermas, J. The Philosophical Discourse of Mo de mihJ. Cam
bridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1987; pp. 131-160 for a provocative discussion of "world" as
"the key term of fundamental ontology" (p. 147) and its significance in modern/
postmociern discourse and controversy.
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Everything around us reveals itself in a new, unfamiliar way. OUl'
world is in flux; nothing appears as it did before; the meaning of
every aspect of our life is transforming. And as the beloved settles in
as the center of our life, all other objects encountered and all other
events engaged once again draw near, but they approach differen.tly.
Being that they are objects and events occurring within our world
which is an horizon of meaning, not a collection of things or mere
spatial extension-they are now interpreted in terms of this new
horizon. And this horizon is determined by the other whom we find
at its center.
The beloved becomes the axis of meaning around which the
"global" circumference of our circumspective concern spins. And if
this is the case, then the blossoming ofthishorizon of meaning cannot
be correctly understood as an ontic occurrence happening within our
world; for it is the very foundation of the worldhood of our world. It
must be conceded that what is happening is happening to our world.
Thus, if to be is to be-in-the-world-with-others and the parameters of
this world are governed by the other whom has become its center,
then death, which according to Heidegger "mean[s] gOing-out-of
the-world, and losing one's being-in-the-world, occurs "not when
objects disappear but when [our world' sl fundamentul structures of
meaning ... are undermined" (l31', p. 281; WS, p. 194). With this
understanding of what it meuns to be-in-the-world, it then seems
clear that the founding of our world cannot reasonably be relegated
to the purely ontic; it cannot be understood in tem1S of studying the
particular person, object or project which has become the center of
our life. Likewise, neither can the deconstruction of our world, via
the collapse of its center, be properly understood as simply an
existentiell crisis; it cannot be appropriately explained in terms of the
absence of an object within the world. These experiences are, ra ther,
the construction and deconsh"uction of the base on which we rest our
understanding of what it means to be.
Ordinarily, in our average everydayness, we find ourselves
comfortably situated in a world which has blossomed forth for us
and which, since this blossoming, we have come to take for granted.
We feel "at home" within this world and easily maneuver through
out it, casually engaging with the objects within our circumspedive
concern as they lend themselves as ready-to-hand instruments for
use in our various projects. Our understanding of Being itself is
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grounded in and delimited by our perspective within this world.
This becomes painfuUy evident when our world falls apart.
When we lose the other, who has come to mean the world to us,
we lose the axis of meaning in terms of which we understood our life
as a whole. Having lost this other, nothing makes sense. For, "here the
totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at
hand discovered within the world is ... of no consequence; it col
lapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking
significance" (BT, p. 231). Our daily chores, once done without
question in order to keep our world together, now induce nausea with
their banal absurdity. Joy now seems possible only for the naive. We
feel that despair is the only true glimpse of reality, though it is never
black enough to be pure. We are not only depressed but morally
offended. The tragedy is experienced not as one event among others,
but as an affront to existence as it is meantto be. We contemplate, and
may even commit suicide, preferring physical demise over confront
ing the fact that Being is proving itself to beradicaUy other than what
we thought it was. s
But just as we may be shaken from our comfortable use of ready
to-hand materials by a disruption in this use (e.g., the car breaks
down), and thereby be forced to understand these objects in an
entirely new way (as present-at-hand), we may also be awakened
from our ontological somnambulism by a crisis so devastating that
it refuses to be understood in terms of our world (BT,pp.102-107). A
crisis of this depth and magnitude cannot be homogenized within
the framework of our circumspective concern as one event among
others, because it undermines the structures of meaning which
enable aU possible events to be understood.
Thus, to hold fast that these supposedly existentieU crises are
5 That suicide is the refusal to throw one's self and one's ontological assump
tions into question, rather than the fundamental question itself, refutes Camus'
claim that "there is but one truly philosophical problem, and that is suicide."
Properly speaking, suicide is not a problem bu t a supposed solution to which one
may come only after "judging whether life is or is not worth living." The Myth of
Sisyphus. New York: Vintage Books, 1955: p. 3. The fundamental, or "truly serious,"
prob lem, to which suicide purports to be an answer, is the question of the meaning
of Being. What I am suggesting is that suicide is not an answer to the question but
the refusal to ask it. For a remarkably creative response to Heideggerian ontology,
Camus' absurdist position and the futility of suicide, see Levinas. E. Time and The
Other. trans. Robert Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1987; p. 50, passim.
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necessarily excluded from ontological discolITse overlooks the real
ization that the truly radical of these events happen to and not within
our world and, therefore, dismantle the structlITes which enabled us
to understand anything, including Being. This exclusion presup
poses that those who experience such a crisis have a conception of the
meaning of Being that transcends the parameters of their everyday
concern. But, as our phenomenological sketch of the loss-of-our
world indicates, in OlIT average everydayness, the boundaries of OlIT
ontological understanding are strictly delimited by that which has
become the center of our world. This being the case, only the loss of
the center of this horizon of meaning can precipitate the sort of
ontological uncertainty characterized by Heideggerian angst. It is
precisely this uncertainty that prompts a mortifying questioning
which, if not repressed, will undermine OlIT ontological presupposi
tions and allow the fundamental ontological question of the meaning
of Being to be raised anew, in all its dreadfulness. The marginalizing
of these supposedly ontic events closes off and restricts from onto
logical discourse the very breach in our ontological assumptions
which, if pursued, will result in a radical rethinking of w hat it means
to be. Rather than plunging us into this breach and compelling us to
confront the dreadful questions that crisis raises about our lives, this
marginalizing restricts these events to the ontic1evel. Consequently,
against Heidegger's intent, it "helps to keep one's ownmost non
relational possibility-of-being completely concealed" (BT, p. 298).
Still, many will contend that even the most devastating of
existentiell crises (e.g., our beloved abandons us, or a tumor is found
in our child) are objects of fear, not angst in the face of nothingness.
This contention holds that whereas angst is "already 'there' and yet
nowhere, ... is so close that it stifles one's breath, and yet it is
nowhere," fear is always of "a detrimental entity [or ontic event]
within the world which comes from some definite region, .,. is
bringing itself close ... and yet might stay away" (BT, pp. 231, 230).
This argument concludes that if our beloved returned to us, or our
child's tumor were found to be benign-that is, if the danger were to
"stay away"-we would remain placidly embedded within OlIT
world rather than radically uprooted from it, as OCClITS in angst.
The problem wi th this objection is threefold. Firs tly, it fails to take
seriously what it means to be-in-a-world and the central importance
of the other, who establishes this world's axis. Secondly, it overlooks
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the insight that an experience of nothingness, or the loss-of-our-world,
occurs when the fundamental structures of our horizon of meaning
are undermined. And lastly, it fails to see that an intimation of the
frailty-the liability to nothingness-of what means the world to us
transcends the fear of any particular object or event, and opens us up
to our "ownmost possibility" insofar as it awakens us to the radical
finitude of every person or thing, every possible world. We are
intimated of the desolate nothingness pervading everything that
could ever mean the world to anyone-even ourselves.
To the degree that these intimations and the questions they raise
about Being are repressed, they may be relegated to the domain of
fear because we refuse to allow them to touch our ontolOgical
presuppositions. Rather than drawing us away from our world, it is
precisely this world and our position in it that is secured most
adamantly. However, these intimations and the questions they raise
need not be repressed. And to the extent that we allow them to
rupture our ontological assumptions, we are open to the encounter
withnothingness and ourownmostpossibilityofbeing ablenottobe.
In short, if such questi.ons are not repressed, we find ourselves
radically dislocated, spiraling in the abyss, confronted with the
inherent nothingness of what we always assumed was Being itself.
It is only in such a destitute position. I would like to suggest, that
the fundamental ontological question of what it means to be can be
authentically asked. For only in this barren state do we realize the
uncompromising import of the question. And this question, as we
have seen, is not only raised by an uncanny experience of angst,
which oozes through and draws us away from our comfort in the
world when everything is ontically normal and existentielly placid.
It may also be precipitated by an existentiell crisis which most
Heideggerians, and Heidegger himself, would argue tends to draw
us away from intimations of death as our ownmost possibility. Their
argument is justified, I have claimed, insofar as we ordinarily recoil
from these intimations and, quite often, divert ourselves from them
with preoccupati.on in the drama of life's crises. I have attempted to
illustrate, though, that this contention takes for granted that existentiell
crises always occur as events within our world. But what is passed
over in silence is the possibility that a crisis which fractures the center
of our world must be said to happen to it not within it. And because
we ordinarily equate Being with the parameters of our world, the
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shattering of this world can be understood as no less than the
shattering of everything we thought was immune to deconstruction.
Only whenour sedimented structures of meaning have collapsed
can the possibility of a new horizon be glimpsed. Only when every
thing we ever thought was Being itself is undermined, only when
Being reveals itself as radically foreign-as radically beyond any and
every understanding we may have had of it-can it become ques
tionable in its very essence and compel the fundamental ontological
question to spring to our lips ... and this is only the beginning ...
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